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The invariance of market innovation




This article provides a set of conditions under which the R&D undertaken in a market
economy is invariant to the number (or size distribution) of firms and the market's allocation
is efficient (i.e., given the aggregate expenditure, the market chooses socially optimal projects).
As in several patent race studies, we assume that a "winner-takes-all" competition determines
firms' gains, but our model differs from earlier studies in that firms are not restricted to
undertake only one research project. Our analysis shows that how one characterizes a firm's
choices (and innovation technologies) has a strong influence on the conclusions one draws
from economic analyses of R&D.
1. Introduction
• A major concern of the recent research in the theory of innovation has been the effect
of market structure on private marginal returns to firms from innovations, and, thus, on
the equilibrium level of R&D undertaken in a market economy. Recent work has also
emphasized the relationship between marginal private returns and social returns which, in
general, may not be the same (Barzel, 1968; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982; Loury, 1979; Stiglitz, 1986). For instance, in some patent races the private
return is either zero, when the firm is not first to invent, or the total appropriable return,
when the firm is first to invent, while the social return is the increase in the present value
of societal gain from having the invention earlier than it otherwise would have been available.
The present analysis is based on a model in which the gains to firms are determined
in a market characterized by Bertrand competition. This assumption gives our model a
"winner-takes-all" feature similar to that in the patent race literature. There is a private
return to innovation only when a single firm innovates; when two (or more) firms innovate,
Bertrand competition means that they earn no profits. In contrast to earlier work, however,
we posit that a firm is not restricted to undertaking only one research project, and that it
may undertake more than one project aimed at the same innovation if it is profitable to do
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SO. In other words, a firm determines not only the expenditure (or effort) on any particular
R&D project it undertakes, but also the number of different projects it will pursue.
Our strongest results follow directly and intuitively from these assumptions. We show
that the marginal private value of an incremental project (or of incremental expenditure
on different projects) does not depend on market structure. The reason is simple. A project
yields a payoff to a firm only when it is the only successful project. If another firm's project
succeeds, the Bertrand competition eliminates all rents. If another project of the same firm
succeeds, the incremental return to the project under consideration is also zero.
The implications of this result are powerful. The most important of them are the
following.
(1) The market portfolio of projects—the number of projects undertaken as well as the
expenditures on each of them—is unaffected by the number of firms. This result, which we
call the "strong invariance result," follows from the earlier observation that the marginal
decisions concerning research projects are not influenced by the number of firms. The strong
invariance result obviously implies that the number of firms has no effect on the pace of
innovation in a market economy. We refer to this as the "weak invariance result." These
conclusions are in marked contrast with some previous studies that have found the number
of firms to be a critical determinant of innovation in a market economy (Barzel, 1968;
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Loury, 1979; Stiglitz, 1986).
(2) The market equilibrium is "efficient" in the sense that the market porfolio of projects
maximizes the economywide probability of a successful innovation, given the total level of
expenditure on R&D. But the market expenditure on R&D is smaller than the socially
optimal level.
These results are fairly general. They hold, for instance, whether research projects have
independent outcomes or not, whether there is symmetric equilibrium or not, and whether
there is a single technology or several different technologies for innovation. In a more re-
stricted model we also establish the following results.
(3) The intensity at which a research project is pursued in the market is invariant to the
magnitude of appropriable rent from successful innovation. If the rent is larger, then the
number of projects undertaken is larger.
(4) The intensity with which a project is undertaken in the market is socially optimal, but,
in general, the market undertakes fewer projects than is socially desirable.
(5) The number of firms in the market affects the division of gains from innovation between
firms and consumers, and, thus, it affects aggregate social gains. A larger number of firms
lowers industry's expected profit as well as the expected profit of an individual firm. Also,
for a class of innovations, a larger number of firms raises consumers' gains as well as the
aggregate social gains from innovation.
For brevity in presentation we develop the above results by using a highly simplified
formal model. The first two results stated above, however, can be generalized in a number
of ways that we identify. In the concluding section we review the central assumptions un-
derlying the strong invariance result, and summarize the main implications that this article
might have for economic analysis of R&D.
2. The model and results
• A research project has a binary outcome: it is either successful or not.' If e is the (varia-
ble) expenditure on a research project, then the probability of its success is p{e)., where
' Here we abstract from issues concerning the timing and the scale of innovations; that is, by spending more
resources one can alter the date of innovation or the magnitude of rent. We discuss these aspects in the last section.
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Pe = dp{e)/de > 0 and I > p > 0 when e is positive but finite. At present we assume that
the outcomes of different projects are independent of one another, regardless of firm aflSl-
iation. A firm can undertake as many projects as it desires, all of which are aimed at the
same innovation. Thus, if ^ y denotes the expenditure by the /th firm on its project >, and if
this firm undertakes > = 1, . . . , A;, projects, then the probability that at least one of the
projects undertaken by this firm is successful is given by g, = 1 — II (1 — p{eij)).^
The gains to firms are determined in a Bertrand market competition. Specifically, the
(positive) rent gained by a firm is R if it innovates and if no other firm innovates. If two or
more firms innovate, then none of them gets any rent, and the benefits of innovation accrue
solely to consumers. We denote by hi the probability that all firms other than the /th firm
V
are unsuccessful. That is, A, = II II (1 - p(efj)), where/= 1 , . . . , A'^  denotes the firms and
N S: 1 and is finite. Then the (expected) profit of firm / is TT, = Rhiqi — 2 (^ y + a), where
a is the fixed cost of undertaking a project. ^°'
We focus on a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium in which all projects have the same
p{e) function, each firm undertakes the same number of projects, and, further, if a firm
undertakes more than one project, then all projects are undertaken at the same level of
expenditure.^ At an interior equilibrium e > 0, A; ^  1, and both e and k are finite. Therefore,
(1)
and
h = {\-p{e)r-K (2)
If q{k) denotes a reduced-form representation of (1), then the first-order conditions
with respect to e and k for a firm's optimum are Rhqe - k = 0 and Rh[q(k) - q(k - 1)]




R{\-p)"-'p = e+a, (4)
where n = Nk is the total number of projects undertaken in the market.
D Strong invariance result. Note that the above expressions determine the expenditure
per project, e, and the total number, n, of projects undertaken in the market. A change in
the number of firms, N, simply changes k and leaves n and e unchanged. Thus, the only
effect of A^  is on the number of projects a firm undertakes, which isk = n/N. In a duopoly,
for instance, each of two firms undertakes half as many projects as a monopoly would have
undertaken. It follows, then, that the number of firms in the market has no impact on the
total number of research projects undertaken and the intensity of each of the projects.
^ Note that we are not assuming constant returns to scale, because the aggregate success probability (that is,
the probability of at least one successful project among a set of projects) does not, in general, increase in proportion
to the number of projects undertaken. In fact, when all projects have the same expenditure level, e, the "production
function" giving the aggregate success probability as a function of total expenditure on research, E, is g = I - (I
- P{eyf'^'^''\ where a is the fixed cost per project.
' As is well known, there may not always exist a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium, for instance, because
of the nonconcavity of the relevant functions. Also, we are assuming that there are no binding constraints (such as
the constraint on credit) that might prevent a firm from undertaking the desired set of projects. We discuss a more
general framework later.
* For simplicity, we have used an equality to represent the optimality with respect to k. A more general
expression is Rhlq(k) - q(k- 1)] a (e + a) > Rh[q(k + 1) - q(k)\. This does not affect the invariance result derived
below.
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Further, let z denote the aggregate probability of innovation in the market, that is, the
probability that at least one of the projects in the market portfolio is successful. Then
z=l-(l-pr. (5)
It is obvious that this probability, which in the present simple model represents the market's
pace of innovation, is also invariant to the number of firms.
We briefly mentioned the intuition behind the strong invariance result in the Intro-
duction. Consider the marginal decision of a firm to undertake the last project (or to invest
the last dollar on a project). This project (or dollar) yields a benefit only if the other projects
undertaken by this firm fail, as well as if all of the projects undertaken by other firms fail.
The marginal decisions are thus influenced by the total number of projects undertaken in
the market and not by how these projects are partitioned between the firm making the
decision and the other firms.
Though we have used a highly simplified model in the above analysis, the strong in-
variance result is more general. In particular, it does not depend on whether the outcomes
of projects within or across firms are statistically independent, whether there is a single
technology or many technologies for innovation, and whether the equilibrium is symmetric
or asymmetric.^
The qualitative reason underlying these generalizations can be seen easily in the matrix
in Table 1, which shows the incremental gain to firm/from undertaking a particular project
at some level of expenditure. It is clear that whether the firm undertakes this project depends
only on the probability that the outcome will be in the northeast quadrant of the matrix
(for brevity, we call this the "incremental probability of success"), and that probabilities of
other outcomes are inconsequential because there is zero gain under these other outcomes.
It is also clear that the incremental probability of success does not depend on how the
projects already accepted are partitioned among firms. The same logic applies to the marginal
decisions of every firm, and the logic is valid regardless of the nature of statistical dependence
among projects or the symmetry or asymmetry within or across firms' portfolios of projects.
To see the same argument formally, let r, denote the probability that a project with
expenditure e, succeeds while all other projects in the economy fail. Then this project will
be undertaken if
Rrj^ej, (6)
and it will not be undertaken if
Rrj<ej. (7)
Now, since the partitioning of projects among firms does not alter r,'s, the number of firms
in the economy does not influence the conditions, (6) and (7), characterizing the market
equilibrium. Thus, it follows directly that the market portfolio is invariant to the number
of firms.
Furthermore, the economic content of the strong invariance result is readily extended
to the cases where there are multiple equilibria. Specifically, if A and A' are two market
TABLE 1 Incremental Gain to Firm/from Undertaking a Particular Project
All Other Projects Any Other Project
of Firm/Fail of Firm/Succeeds
All Projects at All Other Firms Fail R 0
Any Project at Any Other Firm Succeeds 0 0
' In the asymmetric case not only can a firm undertake a set of dissimilar projects, but the project portfoUos
of different firms can also be dissimilar.
102 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
economies with a different number of firms, and if we consider any one of the many equilibria
that economy A can sustain, then this equilibrium project portfolio is also sustainable in
economy A'. Moreover, this result is also unaltered if different firms have access to different
subsets of the economywide set of technologies, provided the same type of firms is in both
economies (though the numbers of firms of different types are different between A
and A').^
We should emphasize here that the strong invariance result does require the equilibria
under consideration to be interior; that is, the firms' choices in an equilibrium are not
determined by reasons other than profitability. An equilibrium is not interior if firms face
constraints on the number of projects (of the technologies to which they have access) they
can undertake and if, because of this constraint, one or more firms undertake fewer projects
than they would have otherwise undertaken. The reason is intuitive. If one firm undertakes
one or more projects at inefficient levels because of the constraints it faces, then it may lead
some other firms to undertake projects at inefficient levels, because the marginal gains to
these firms are influenced by what is undertaken in the market.
The preceding comment suggests another useful observation. As we mentioned earlier,
conventional analyses of R&D have typically restricted a firm to undertaking only one
project. Such a specification implies in our model that the firms' choices have been forced
not to be interior. The resulting inefficient equilibrium in R&D is not surprisingly sensitive
to the number of firms. This can be seen in our basic model by noting from (3) that if A; is
exogenously fixed at unity, then the expenditure per project—and hence the economywide
probability of innovation, given by z in (5)—depend, in general, on the number of firms.
But such a dependence of R&D on market structure could be viewed as nothing more than
an artifact of the arbitrary specification of firms' choices and research technologies.
D Other characteristics of market portfolio. Reverting to our simple model, we obtain
the following from expressions (3) and (4):
(8)
This shows that in market equilibrium the marginal increase (by spending an extra dollar)
in the success probability of a project is equal to the average (per dollar) probability of
success. This is exactly what one would expect, because in our model a firm chooses not
only how much it will spend on a project, but also how many projects it will undertake.
An immediate consequence of (8) is that the expenditure per project is independent of the
rent from successful innovation.
It is important to note here that the assumptions of a symmetric equilibrium and of a
statistical independence among the outcomes of projects are crucial to this result as well as
to other results derived below, except those noted otherwise. To see this consider a project
with expenditure ej that has been undertaken on the margin, and let tij denote the probability
that all other projects fail. Then the expressions analogous to (3) and (4) are RrjjpJ^ej) = 1,
and RvjPiej) = ej + a. These yield p^ej) = p(.ej)l{,ej + a). It follows, then, that (8) must hold
in a symmetric equilibrium because in this case all projects are identical as well as marginal.
The above result can be easily extended to the case in which there are several alterna-
tive technologies of innovation. Let the superscript T denote different technologies. Thus,
for a project using technology T, a^ denotes the fixed cost, and /7^(e^) denotes the prob-
ability of success when the expenditure is e^. Analogous to (8), then, the condition
Pe(^^) = p\e^)l(e^ + a^) would hold for each technology that is used in equilibrium. The
preceding condition not only indicates the independence of project size (of a given technol-
ogy) to the rent R, but also provides the equilibrium relationship among the levels of ex-
penditure on the projects using different technologies.
' For a derivation of these results, see a more detailed version (1986) of this article.
SAH AND STIGLITZ / 103
Finally, by perturbing (3) with respect to R, and noting that e is invariant to this
perturbation, we obtain
(9)
Thus, as one would expect, a larger number of projects is undertaken in the market if the
rent from innovation is larger.
D Welfare analysis of market portfolio. The strong invariance results we have derived
above might give an impression that the number of firms as well as the public policy that
might affect this number has no role to play in the context of research and innovation. This
is not correct because although the number of firms does not affect the aggregate probability
of innovation, it does affect the division of this probability between the case when only one
firm innovates and the case when more than one firm innovates. Since the postinnovation
gains to consumers (or firms) are different under these two cases, their expected gains are
affected by the number of firms.
To see this, note that Nhq represents the probability that only one firm innovates, and
recall that z, given in (5), denotes the aggregate probability of innovation in the market.
Therefore, if ^  denotes the probability that two or more firms innovate, then
g = z-Nhq. (10)
Our earlier analysis has shown that z is independent of A^ . Thus, it follows that the division
of z between g and Nhq is not independent of A'^ , because'
d(NhqydN= h[k In (I-p) + q]<0. (11)
This is what we would expect: if the same number of projects is divided among a larger
number of firms, then the probability that two or more firms will innovate is higher, and,
correspondingly, the probability that only one firm v^ dll innovate is lower.
The above reasoning also suggests that a larger number of firms would lower the ag-
gregate profit of firms. This can be ascertained as follows. The aggregate profit is
Nir = RNhq-n(e + a). (12)
Note that the second term in the right-hand side of (12) does not depend on A^ . But, from
(11), the first term is decreasing in N. Thus, d{Nir)/dN < 0. Further,
dir/dN=
if a firm's profit is nonnegative, as we assume. Therefore, a larger number of firms lowers
the profit for a single firm as well as for the economy as a whole.
Next consider consumers. They face a monopoly on the fruits of innovation if only
one firm innovates, but get the entire benefit from innovation if two or more firms innovate.
If their gains in these two cases are represented by ^i and ^2, respectively, then ^2 - 5*1
represents the loss due to monopoly, relative to the case when consumers receive the full
benefit of innovation. Normally, 52 - ^i will be positive.* Now, the expected gain to con-
sumers isS = SiNhq + S2g. Thus, using (10), we can restate 5 as
(13)
' W e obtain the sign of (11) as follows. From (1), q(k) is easily seen to be strictly concave in k. Thus,
q{k) - q{0) < qiff))k. Using(1) again, we obtain /cln (1 - p ) + q(k) <0. Therefore, (11) is negative.
' Consider, for instance, the case of a cost-reducing innovation. Suppose the innovation reduces the fixed
unit cost of a product from Cb to C2, where Cb is the current (competitive) price. If only one firm innovates, then it
sets a monopoly price Ci, where Co^ c,> C2. The rent to this firm is i? = (ci - C2)D(c,), where D is the aggregate
demand function. If more than one firm innovates, then—owing to Bertrand competition—the new competitive
price is C2. Obviously, then, 52 — 5i > 0. Also, unless the demand is entirely insensitive to the price, the standard
consumers' surplus arguments show that S2 — Si> R.
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where the first term on the right-hand side represents the full gain from innovation and the
second term represents the loss due to monopoly. From (11) and (13) it is obvious that the
consumers' gain is larger if the number of firms is larger.
Since the number of firms has opposite effects on consumers and firms, we combine
these two effects to study the societal implications. Our analysis here assigns equal weights
to the gains of consumers and firms, but we can easily rephrase the results if the weights
are different. The social gain is B = S + Nir, which, from (12) and (13), can be expressed
as
B = S2Z-(S2-Si-R)Nhq-n(e + a). (14)
It is apparent from (11) and (14) that whether the social gain is increasing or decreasing in
the number of firms depends on whether the consumers' loss due to monopoly, (S2 - Si),
is larger or smaller than the firms' rent from monopoly, R. In typical cases consumers suffer
deadweight losses when a monopoly captures any rents: 5*2 - ^i > R.^ In these cases a larger
number of firms yields a larger social gain.
The last result also suggests that if the government can alter the number of firms in a
nondistortive manner (for instance, through an entry subsidy) and if there are no fixed costs
associated with establishing a firm, then the optimal number of firms is such that each firm
undertakes a single project. Obviously, if there are fixed costs, we can use (14) to calculate
the corresponding optimal number of firms.'"
D Comparison between market portfolio and social optimum. Our objective here is to
contrast the socially optimal resource allocation to R&D with the market allocation we
described. Let n denote the number of projects undertaken by the planner. Then z, given
in (5), is the probability that at least one project is successful, in which case consumers
receive the full benefits of innovation. The expected social gain is S2Z - n(e + a)." The




S2(l-p)''-'p = e+a. (16)
Note the similarity between the social allocation described above, and the market equilibrium
described by (3) and (4). The two sets of expressions are identical except that the gain from
successful innovation is R for a firm, whereas it is S2 for the planner. This similarity should
not be surprising because, once again, the marginal decision of the planner (to undertake
the last project, or to invest the last dollar on a project) depends on the total number of
projects that have already been undertaken, just as it did for a firm in the market. Now,
recall that de/dR = 0. It follows then that the market expenditure per project is at the socially
efficient level. An immediate consequence of the above result is that the planner would
select exactly the portfolio of research projects that a market does if he were constrained
to spend no more than what the market spends. In this sense the market portfolio of projects
is "efficient."
' See footnote 8.
'" Naturally, these conclusions do not extend to distortive instruments such as investment tax credits. Also,
certain instruments of policy may not be feasible owing to informational problems. For example, it may be difficult
to monitor the number of projects a firm undertakes.
" As in some earlier literature (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), the present treatment of the social optimum
assumes that the revenue required to finance the R&D can be raised in a nondistortive manner. If only distortive
instruments (such as commodity taxes) are available for raising revenue, then under some circumstances the welfare
consequence of the market allocation may not be significantly different from that of the social optimum. See Stiglitz
(1986).
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Next, recalling (9), we see that the similarity between the market equilibrium and the
social optimum also implies that whether the number of projects undertaken in the market
is smaller (or larger) than the socially optimal number depends on whether ^2 is larger (or
smaller) than R. In a wide variety of circumstances (for instance, for innovations dealing
with cost reduction), the full consumers' gain from innovation is larger than the rents to a
firm from monopolizing the innovation: S2 > R. In these cases it follows that the market
undertakes fewer projects than are socially desirable.
The last two results concerning the market portfolio—that this portfolio is efficient,
but that it entails a smaller expenditure than what is socially optimal—can, once again, be
shown to be robust to several aspects of the model. In fact, these results are generalizable
in the same way we described earlier in the context of the invariance result. To see this let
Mj represent the number of projects with expenditure ej, and let r{Mi, M2,...) denote the
probability that at least one project out of an arbitrary portfolio {Mi, M2, . . . ) is successful.
Then it is straightforward to verify that if the planner were to maximize Rr{,Mi,M2,...)
- 2 Mjej, the optimality conditions for the resulting portfolio are (6) and (7). That is, the
jj
optimality conditions are the same as the market equilibrium conditions.
Next, denote the market portfolio by {Mt, Mf, . . .).'^ Clearly, then, the portfolio
(Mf, M f , . . . ) maximizes the probability of at least one successful project, r(Mi, M2,...),
when the planner can spend no more than 2 Mfej. It follows, therefore, that the planner
j
will choose the same portfolio, even when he is maximizing S2r(.Mi, M2,...), provided he
is constrained to spend no more than the expenditure, 2 Mfej, undertaken by the market.
j
Further, the expenditure of a social planner would exceed 2 Mfej if he did not face any
j
constraint on spending. This is so since the social gain from a successful project, 52, exceeds
R. Thus, the market expenditure on R&D is smaller than what is socially optimal.
3. Concluding remarks
• The question of the relationship between market structure and innovation is a central
one, both for economic theory and economic policy. A long-standing concern of antitrust
policy has been whether lack of competition dampens incentives to innovate. Earlier studies
on the relationship between the number of firms and the level of innovation tended to
confirm the standard view that competition and the pace of innovation would be positively
correlated.'^ Thus, the absence of any relationship between the two in the present study
would appear to be a significant finding. The question is, to what can we attribute the
difference between our results and the standard view? What broader implications might our
results have for the economic analysis of R&D?
Before we address these issues, it is important to point out that the particular type of
invariance on which the earlier analysis has focused requires each project in the market
portfolio of research projects to be unaffected by the number of firms. This is a very "strong"
form of invariance indeed, because what is relevant for many critical economic questions
(such as the determinants of the pace of innovation in the economy) is not the composition
of the market portfolio of projects, but only the economywide probabilities of innovation
(represented in our basic model by the probability z). It is useful, therefore, to distinguish
between the strong invariance analyzed earlier and a "weak invariance" that merely requires
'^  For brevity, we are assuming here that a unique project portfolio represents the market equilibrium. See
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) for an extension to the cases of multiple equilibria.
'^  We are assuming, of course, that the firm could obtain a patent on the innovation. See, for instance, Loury
(1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
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the economywide pace of innovation to be not significantly sensitive to the number of firms.
Since strong invariance implies weak invariance, but not vice versa, it is obvious that the
latter would hold under a wider set of circumstances than those under which the former
would hold.
We have emphasized in the last section that the strong invariance result holds in models
far more general than the simplified formal model we have used. This result holds, for
instance, when there is asymmetric equilibrium, or when there are complex correlations
among the outcomes of various projects. We have also emphasized a critical difference
between our model, in which firms are not constrained to undertake only one research
project, and earlier analyses, in which a firm is assumed to undertake only one project. The
existence of a relationship in the latter models between the number of firms and the pace
of R&D can be viewed, in part, as a consequence of the imposed restriction on firms' choices
and innovation technologies.
At the same time, certain crucial assumptions are required for the strong invariance
result to hold; we discuss here three assumptions that appear to be particularly important.
First, we have assumed that the cost of a particular project, or the probabilities of its outcome,
are not significantly affected by the "firm affiliation" of the project (that is, which firm
undertakes this particular project). Thus, the probability of success of a particular project
(conditional, say, on the failure of all other projects) is a function of the expenditure on
that project and the expenditures on other projects, but not a function of the firms in which
those other projects are undertaken.'"' Whether this assumption is plausible depends on the
nature and organization of a firm.
If the information flows affecting the outcomes of different projects within a firm are
markedly different from those across firms (for instance, because the same researchers are
involved in more than one project undertaken vwthin a firm), then the firm affiliation of
projects may affect the interactions among their outcomes. On the other hand, if different
projects within a firm are sufficiently isolated from one another (for instance, because of
the need to monitor the performance of different groups of researchers), then the firm
affiliation may be less relevant. Clearly, these issues go to the heart of the question of what
is a firm, a question that we obviously cannot solve in this brief article.
Analogously, we have assumed that the incremental cost of a particular project with
given conditional probabilities of outcomes is not significantly influenced by which other
projects the firm has already undertaken. If, on the other hand, there are significant intrafirm
cost economies or diseconomies across projects, then economic efficiency will, of course,
entail there being an "efficient" number of firms. But in this case a change in the number
of firms might affect the pace of innovation not because of the effect on the level of com-
petition, but because of the effect on the costs of undertaking R&D. Indeed, we conjecture
that one could obtain a modified invariance result of the form that, if there were a sufficiently
large number of firms capable of undertaking R&D, then the equilibrium pace of innovation
would be unaffected by the number of firms, because a subset of firms would be undertaking
R&D at an efficient level.
The second assumption is that every project yields the same rent if it is the "successful"
project; that is, the research projects are aimed at specific process innovations or, equivalently,
at specific product innovations for perfect substitutes. To see this consider a model where
''' More precisely, the nature of interactions among the outcomes of a specific set of projects is invariant to
how this set of projects is divided among the firms. Thus, for example, if there are three projects, then the probabilities
of various outcomes (such as the probability that the first two projects are successful but the third is not) is not
significantly affected by whether the same firm undertakes all three projects or three different firms undertake one
project each.
SAH AND STIGLITZ / 107
the outcome of a research project (aimed at cost reduction) is a distribution of (unit) costs
for producing a particular good.'^  Let the stochastic variable c, denote the cost attained by
project J, let c* denote the minimum cost attained by all firms (across all of their projects)
excluding the firm (say, firm / ) that is considering whether to undertake project;", and
let c** denote the minimum cost attained by all projects in the economy other than proj-
ect;. Thus, c** is the minimum ofthe costs attained by firm/on all its projects other
than project j , as well as the costs attained by other firms on all of their projects. Clearly,
f * - • r**
Now, if D( •) denotes the aggregate demand for the good as a function of its price, then
Bertrand competition implies that the stochastic representation ofthe incremental gain to
firm/ from project; is Z)(c*)[Max (0, c** - c,}].'* It is apparent from the preceding
expression that the incremental gain from project; is independent of which firm undertakes
project;' if (i) there are only two outcomes of a research project ("success" or "failure" in
reducing the cost by a specific amount), or (ii) the aggregate demand for the good is not
significantly sensitive to price changes in the relevant range (that is, in the range between
c* and c**). In other cases, which firm undertakes what projects can make a diflference to
the magnitude of rent from innovation. Similar effects arise within a monopolistically com-
petitive model, where competition is focused on developing new products that are not
perfect substitutes for each other.
The third important assumption underlying the strong invariance result is that the
project market competition is Bertrand. What is relevant here is the implication of such a
competition that the "winner takes all." In Coumot equilibrium, on the other hand, if the
innovation is not "large," the winner does not take all. If project;' undertaken by firm/is
successful, the marginal return to this firm from the success of another project that this firm
has undertaken is zero, but the gain to this firm from the success of a project undertaken
by some other firm is not zero. Thus, in our model the degree of competition in the product
market affects how the benefits of R&D are split between consumers and producers, but it
does not affect the level of R&D. In a Coumot model, however, both the split of benefits
between consumers and producers and the level of R&D are affected.
We can thus restate our central message as follows. It is not surprising, as the above
discussion shows, that there is a range of important circumstances under which the strong
invariance result will not hold. What is surprising is that this result holds in as many cir-
cumstances as it does. Clearly, then, to analyze innovation in a market economy, we must
consider more than the number (or the size distribution) of firms in the market. Indeed,
key to ascertaining the effect of market structure on the pace of innovation are an analysis
of firms' choices—including the technology of innovation and the intrafirm externalities
across different projects and activities undertaken by a firm—and an analysis of how the
gains from innovation are divided among competing firms through the competition in
product markets. Furthermore, our analysis suggests the need to investigate weaker versions
of invariance of economywide innovation to market structure. In other words, what is
relevant is not merely to note that in a particular model the aggregate pace of innovation
is influenced by the number of firms, but also to determine how significant or insignificant
this influence is, and what specific features of the economy contribute to the significance
of such an influence.
" Obviously, the only relevant outcomes are those under which the cost is smaller than the current cost.
" Bertrand competition means here that when a project of firm /yields the lowest cost in the economy,
then this firm becomes a monopolist, and it sets the price ofthe product at a level infinitesimally smaller than c*,
which is the lowest cost achieved by all other firms. The case where the monopolist chooses to set a price between
c* and c** is analogous.
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